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The editors of the Case Western Reserve Law Review respectfully 
dedicate this issue to Professor Judith Lipton. 
 
Bryan L. Adamson† 
Tribute to Judith Lipton 
In her remarks at the Milton A. Kramer Law Clinic Center’s 
dedication ceremony in 2000, Judy Lipton opened by stressing that, for 
clinicians, pedagogy and lawyering center the client narrative, the client 
story in our legal representation. Then, in her measured, natural, and 
captivating style, she proceeded to tell the story of the Clinic’s 
beginnings and its centrality to both the educational mission of Case 
Western Reserve Law and the School’s service to the surrounding 
community. It was a thoughtful, inspiring presentation that I have not 
forgotten. 
So, as Judy would counsel, I will start by telling a story. I joined 
the Case Western Reserve Law faculty as a clinician in 1995, and, for 
a time, I co-taught with Judy in the Criminal Law Clinic. There is one 
particular client that she and her clinic students represented who I still 
remember today. That client was an African-American lesbian woman 
who was in distress after a particularly intense argument with her live-
in partner. At some time during or shortly after the quarrel, the client 
began to have suicidal thoughts and called the local suicide hotline. The 
social worker on the other end engaged the client for some time, but 
became so concerned about the client actually inflicting self-harm that 
he (secretly) called 911 (calling in secret is routine when, in the social 
worker’s judgment, real harm is likely to ensue). 
Police officers arrived at the client’s home and knocked on her front 
door. The client answered. By the time they arrived, however, the client 
had concluded her conversation with the hotline social worker and was 
feeling better; she told the officers as much. The police officers asked to 
enter her home. The client—who had a discomfiting history with the 
local police that left her wary and distrustful—reiterated that she and 
her partner were fine, and refused (as was her right). The officers then 
issued her a citation . . . for inciting panic. 
Even though it was not my case, and the clinic workers were not 
my students, I recall it because the faculty discussed it in our weekly 
case rounds. It sticks with me to this day because it was beset with so 
many of the issues that—beyond the importance of client stories to 
competent representation—we and our students often had to unpack, 
including professional-ethics issues and the deeply troubling experiences 
of the marginalized in our law enforcement and legal institutions. 
 
†  Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law.  
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The absurd, disturbing outcome of that client’s experience, viz., 
that a citizen—once suicidal, now fine—would be criminally charged 
for causing two law enforcement officers to check on her well-being, was 
fundamentally unfathomable. Judy’s intelligent and holistic approach 
to the case was something to emulate. She was intent on ensuring that 
her students used that as a point to reflect upon and inform the legal 
representation. Judy ensured that her students understood that the 
client’s story was about much more than the client’s relationship with 
her partner and what happened that day. She compelled them to ask 
about the client’s experience in her community and how her jaundiced, 
fearful views of local police informed that day’s encounter. In doing so, 
Judy was able to facilitate rich conversations with her students to help 
them better appreciate the ways in which race, class, and gender (to 
say nothing of sexual orientation) are the lenses through which our 
clients experience their encounters with law enforcement and the 
criminal justice system; to get them to understand that those traits are 
almost always a factor in how their clients are perceived by the agents 
working in those systems. 
Finally, the case also surfaced important lessons on comparative 
ethics: how attorneys’ obligations to their clients are, in vital ways, 
different from social workers’ obligations to theirs, and how sometimes 
those obligations can compete in the same case. Judy’s keen 
understanding of both legal and social work pedagogies allowed her to 
teach her students about the interplay between those professions and 
the ethical issues triggered when attorneys and social workers have 
competing obligations to the same client. That latter point explains 
Judy’s approach to teaching and lawyering, a persistent demand that 
an ethos of humanity be an indispensable part of our work. I am fairly 
sure that her training—first as a nurse and a social worker, then as a 
first-rate lawyer—is responsible for her deft ability to integrate legal 
and social-work education; I am certain it was Judy’s modest 
upbringing—as the daughter of a Holocaust survivor—that caused the 
ethos of compassion and care to be shut in her bones. 
Judy was at the forefront of the integration of social work pedagogy 
into the art and science of lawyering. Upon arriving at Case Western 
Reserve in 1983, Judy had already obtained her Master’s Degree in 
Social Work, and had a joint appointment with the Mandel School. She 
was instrumental in setting up Case Western Reserve’s first-of-its-kind 
joint degree program of Juris Doctor/Masters of Science in Social 
Administration (Masters in Social Work). By integrating social work 
pedagogy into clinical legal education, Judy created significant ex–
periences for her family-law and clinic students, which especially 
redounded outcomes for clinic clients. 
Judy has long understood the value that social work adds to legal 
representation. She “truly apprehend[s] the reality of the other [e.g. the 
client]; not just to understand instrumentally how to move, persuade 
or affect that person, but to understand what meaning the interaction 
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has for that person in a caring and existential sense.”1 Judy recognized 
long ago that the ethic of care in the attorney’s relationship with and 
counseling of the client produces solutions that are more creative and 
better tailored to each client, making those solutions ultimately more 
satisfying to the client. Simultaneously, that approach counsels against 
the tendency of lawyers, with our “problem solving” paradigm, to 
overstep boundaries and impinge upon client autonomy. 
Importantly, Judy enabled her students to inquire about and 
examine the roles that race, gender, and homophobia played in the 
police-client interaction. The centering of the client—her story, exper–
iences, and goals—in shaping the strategy and approach to the legal 
representation was paramount. At the same time, the respect for client 
decision-making autonomy was shaped and balanced in a way that did 
not compromise the students’ moral or ethical integrity. That centering 
of the client’s positionality best ensured that the case outcome was, 
most importantly, satisfactory to the client. 
That same intelligence and thoughtfulness also informed her 
leadership as a colleague and clinic co-director (along with Ken 
Margolis) during a particularly challenging time for law schools and 
clinical legal education. 
Nineteen ninety-five was an interesting time to become a clinician. 
Case Western Reserve, like other law schools nationally, was having 
difficult, complex conversations regarding the employment status of 
clinical faculty within the institution. At that time, most law schools 
did not confer traditional tenure-track or tenure status upon those hired 
as clinicians. Instead, schools predominately offered clinical tenure-
track,2 long-term contracts (e.g., five- or seven-year terms), or short-
term contracts (e.g., for one- to three-year terms).3 While those 
employment models did not always carry mandatory scholarship-
production requirements, they offered less position security (e.g., 
termination decisions could be solely decanal), voting rights, salary, and 
other perquisites. 
At this juncture, a bit of historical context on the place of clinical 
legal education in the law schools might be helpful. In the earliest parts 
 
1. Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-
examining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 Fordham L. 
Rev. 2123, 2126–28 (1999). 
2. Clinical-tenure status models create a system of tenure uniquely tailored 
to clinical faculty. Bryan L. Adamson et al., Clinical Faculty in the Legal 
Academy: Hiring, Promotion and Retention, 62 J. Legal Educ. 115, 
127–28 (2012). 
3. Clinical fellowships are a variation on short-term contracts, generally 
designed to expand the number of clinical course seats available to 
students, provide clinic case coverage, and/or to provide experiential 
opportunities for fellows interested in entering the teaching market. Id. at 
131. 
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of the twentieth century, the Langdellian model of law-school teaching 
was firmly entrenched, the pedagogical foundations laid by teaching 
about and through appellate cases. In the 1920s, legal scholars such as 
Karl Llewellyn, Jerome Frank, and John Bradway were recommending 
that law schools create legal clinics staffed by full-time law teachers 
who would focus on teaching students “the true relationship between 
the contents of upper-court opinions and the work of practicing lawyers 
and courts.”4 While those progenitors emphasized the development of 
professional judgment, there were those like Arch Cantrell in the 1950s 
who envisioned clinics as places to train students in the basic skills of 
practice. 
Even as clinical legal education took serious hold in the academy in 
the 1960s—when demands by students for social relevance in the law 
school curriculum led to the growth of clinical programs—clinics took 
on a more explicit social-justice mission in their work and student 
education. The clinician’s status within law schools, however, was still 
highly contingent, and certainly a coherent clinical pedagogy had yet 
to be developed. The latter began to germinate in earnest in the 1980s. 
It was during that time that Judy and others came to clinical teaching, 
with the distinctive experience in legal services and social-justice 
advocacy that provided the foundations for emerging pedagogical 
frameworks that would serve the dual purposes of training students to 
be competent, capable attorneys while providing vital legal services to 
those who might otherwise go without. Thus, I arrived during a time 
in which intentional, robust consideration of the role and status of 
clinical faculty began to take hold, with a growing chorus of faculty 
convinced that law schools, in the hiring, promotion, and retention of 
clinical faculty, should be regarded more equitably and recognize the 
responsibilities, pedagogical methodologies, and value clinicians 
brought to the educational enterprise. 
By the 1980s, and certainly by 1995, legal education had come a 
long way from the legal realists of the 1920s, but there was still debate 
regarding how law schools viewed and valued clinical legal educators 
and clinical education, particularly compared to the status and security 
of position conferred upon “doctrinal,” or “podium” faculty. Conver–
sations were fraught with implicit and explicit references to compar–
ative intellectual superiority/inferiority, competing visions of law 
schools as either citadels dedicated to the production of knowledge or a 
high-priced trade school; bloc voting that would result in clinical 
“capture” of the institution, and the economic consequences of status 
equity. 
There were other inter- and intra-program concerns that stymied 
the development of workable solutions. Legal-writing faculty abided by 
their well-founded concerns about being viewed as second-class citizens 
 
4. Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 Yale L.J. 1303, 1317 
(1947). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Tribute to Professor Judith Lipton 
243 
in the institution. Clinicians themselves were not of one mind as to 
whether a unitary system of hiring, promotion, and retention was the 
right solution. Alternative models that approximated tenure-track were 
attractive to some, while other clinicians—highly regarded and with a 
satisfying level of security the long-term-contract model offered—
rightfully saw little reason to place themselves in an uncertain system, 
especially when the idea of grand-parenting in longer-serving clinicians 
was not an option. 
For us at Case Western Reserve, Judy played an indispensable role 
in navigating this politically, and practically tense debate. She saw the 
unitary tenure model growing across the nation and was a strong voice 
in favor of Case Western Reserve adopting it. At the same time, she 
recognized that the unitary model was not for or accepted by everyone. 
Ultimately, through Judy’s efforts and the efforts of other colleagues, 
Case Western Reserve settled upon a unitary model with an opt-in 
provision for vested faculty. It was a victory for the entire school and 
a testament to the respect Judy commands as a faculty member, as a 
leader, and as a forthright institutional citizen. 
Judy retires as the Associate Dean for Experiential Education and 
with the Honorable Blanche E. Krupansky and Frank W. Vargo, Jr. 
Professor in Criminal Law Chair. It is no exaggeration to say that 
without Judy, Case Western Reserve’s clinical program would not be 
as well-regarded as it is today, both at Case Western Reserve and 
throughout the legal academy. From the clients and students who have 
benefitted from her lawyering and teaching, to faculty like me, who 
benefitted from her collegiality, Judy, with her unyielding grace and 
kindness, has left an enduring impact. She has blessed me, however, 
with more. Few people have been as important in my professional and 
personal life as she. I could scarcely envision having a better counselor, 
champion, or friend. 
